Abstract-This paper proposes a game-theoretic random access model, compliant with the IEEE 802.11 standard, that can be integrated into the distributed coordination function (DCF). The objective is to design a game theoretic model that can potentially optimize throughput and fairness in each node independently and, therefore, minimise channel access delay. We propose a utility function, such that it can decouple the protocol's dynamic adaptation to channel load from collision detection. We demonstrate that our model can reach a Nash equilibrium that results in a relatively stable contention window, provided that a node adapts its behavior to the idle rate of the broadcast channel, coupled with observation of its own transmission activity. The simulation results show that this model is capable of achieving much higher throughput than the standard IEEE 802.11 DCF with absolutely better short-time fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of the IEEE 802.11 wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) standard in virtually all mobile computing devices owes much to the simplicity and effectiveness of its medium access control (MAC) protocol. WLANs can operate in two modes, centralized and decentralized. The centralized mode is known as the Point Coordination Function (PCF) and is also considered as an optional mode. The decentralized mode is the fundamental mechanism that provides access to the broadcast medium for WLANs and is called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) [1] . During the last decade much research effort has been directed on quantifying the DCF performance and improving its throughput and fairness [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . The broad consensus in the published literature [2] , [6] is that the performance of DCF is highly dependent on the number of active nodes in the network. Consequently, most of the proposals for improving 802.11 attempt to estimate the number of competing stations in the network and adjust the contention window size accordingly [6] , [7] . Practically it is difficult to calculate the number of (active) competing stations accurately because the DCF backoff scheme cannot distinguish collisions from frame corruption events that commonly occur in wireless networks, especially in weak signal areas. Thus, most proposed methods that depend on estimating the number of (active) nodes suffer from the above inaccuracy. We seek a channel access method that decouples the channel access probability P τ i from the conditional collision probability P c i , in order to provide the ability to discriminate between channel contention and occasional channel lack of reliability. Thus, in order to achieve high throughput and relatively good shorttime fairness, we propose a game-theoretic random access model based on CSMA/CA that provides an appropriate contention window size independently for each node in the network, this yields an almost equal channel access probability for all nodes only through local observation of consecutive idle slots between transmissions.
A. Related work
The application of game theory to medium access control is the subject of numerous publications in the past decade [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . Xiao et al. [9] present a simple Nash equilibrium back-off strategy to resolve channel access unfairness by observing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of all active nodes in the wireless network. However, in [9] each node has to broadcast its signal-to-noise ratio periodically, which makes the method hard to implement in the current family of 802.11 protocols. Zhao et al. [7] proposed a game to improve the WLAN MAC performance based on the estimation of the number of competing nodes in the network, by calculating the conditional collision probability for each node in the network. However, it is relatively hard to calculate the number of active nodes accurately.
Chen et al. [10] employ a non-cooperative game for contention-based medium access. The utility function that dictates the strategy of each node is dependent on the channel access probability. The cost of transmission is given by the probability of collision. Their contribution is similar to ours, but our choice of game boundaries and the design of our utility function differ from [10] in that they are based on the channel idle rate rather than P c i .
B. Operating principles of the proposed protocol
We adopt a non-cooperative, static, game-theoretic approach to model contention-based wireless medium access. In noncooperative games, the players make rational decisions considering only their individual payoffs. The players are unable to reach an enforceable contract, but this does not mean that the players do not cooperate, provided that the game is appropriately designed. However, any cooperation implied by this kind of games must be self-enforcing. Moreover, due to the nature of the wireless channel, we use a static game which means that all players make decisions without the knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by the remaining competing players. To design utility and payoff functions, a single cell network is assumed which means all nodes can see each other. We employ the idle sense method to design our utility and payoff functions, as proposed by Heusse et al. [11] , which derives the optimal number of consecutive idle time slots between transmissions, dependent on the channel modulation scheme, in order to avoid or minimise contention. Then gradient play is used as a strategy update mechanism to dynamically control the contention window size, by adjusting a current channel access probability gradually in a gradient direction towards the optimal value of the number of idle slots observed between transmission attempts.We show that our model can improve network throughput and short-time fairness through numerical simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In sections II and III, we respectively formulate the game and design a MAC based on the formulated game. Then its performance evaluation based on simulation results is presented in section IV. Finally in section V, we conclude and suggest how to extend this model to wireless network with hidden nodes as well as to multi-cell wireless networks.
II. FORMULATION OF RANDOM ACCESS MODEL
We structure the formulation of a random access game theoretic model by first reviewing the operation of 802.11 DCF and casting the essence of its operation in game theoretic terms by specifying a per-node utility function in II-A. Section II-B defines the Nash equilibrium and investigates under what kind of conditions a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium can be achieved. Then in section II-C, design of utility function is specified using reverse engineering from a desired point of operation based on the conditions discussed in section II-B. Finally, in section II-D we propose a method based on the game that adjusts the contention window size much less aggressively than the commonly used binary exponential backoff algorithm.
A. Description of DCF and The Game
A node wishing to transmit, senses the carrier on the channel. If the channel remains idle for a period of time, called a Distributed Inter Frame Space (DIFS), the node transmits. Otherwise, the node persists in sensing the channel until this is measured as being idle for a DIFS. At this point, the node generates a random slotted backoff interval before transmitting. It chooses backoff b, an integer distributed uniformly in the window [0, CW ], and waits for period of b time slots before attempting to transmit, provided the channel remains idle. This procedure will be repeated until the node transmits its packet. If the frame is correctly received, the receiving node transmits an ACK frame after a fixed period of time, called a Short Inter Frame Space (SIFS). Otherwise, if the transmitting node does not receive the ACK frame, it executes the exponential backoff algorithm (it doubles CW , which is bounded between CW min and CW max ) and repeats the transmission attempt up to a maximum number of attempts. Now consider a set of wireless network nodes N with DCF as the contention protocol. Associated with each wireless node i ∈ N is its channel access probability P τ i (t) and a certain contention measure observed by each node through the backoff mechanism. As stated in the description of DCF, each node in the network can observe its own channel access probability P τ i (t) and its conditional collision probability (contention measure) P c i (t), but not those of other nodes. It can then adjust its channel access probability P τ i (t) based on a system control point of view, written as:
where time is slotted, in units of a slot duration.The conditional collision probability depends on the channel access probability, represented through a vector
Here, F i models the contention resolution algorithm and C i models a mechanism which updates the conditional collision probability in DCF. We assume that Eq. (1) and (2) have an equilibrium (P τ , P c ). The fixed point of Eq. (1) defines an implicit relation between the equilibrium P τ i (t) and P c i (t). Then, by the implicit function theorem [12] , there exists a unique continuously differentiable function F i , such that,
In DCF the conditional collision probability is defined as [2] ,
The contention window (CW ) in DCF is formulated in terms of the node channel access probability, P τ i . The CW easily maps to a backoff mechanism by the following correspondence between P τ i and a constant contention window CW , that holds in saturation mode [2] . The saturation mode implies that every node has a packet ready to transmit at all times.
It is shown in [2] that when no exponential back-off is considered, the probability P τ i is independent of P c i (c.f. Eq. (5)). However, the current back-off scheme in DCF considers the lack of an ACK reception as a collision and doubles its contention window which is the main source of short-time unfairness [5] . Therefore, we consider a constant contention window in our utility function design in order to preserve the independence of P τ i from P c i . As will become clear later, such a choice of constant contention window in the protocol plays a crucial role in guaranteeing the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and enabling the design of a payoff function. Therefore, we define the utility function of each node i as:
Based on the Lack of dependency of P τ i on P c i embodied in Eq. (5) and the utility function (6), a random access game G is defined as a triple G = {N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N } where N is the set of players (nodes in the network). Player i ∈ N , adopts
, with a utility function U i (P τ i ) and price function P τ i C i (P τ ). Note that the throughput and fairness of node i depend on the P τ i (as throughput is proportional to P τ i , if there is no collision in the network). P τ i C i (P τ ) is considered as a contention price for node i for a given P τ i . Therefore, potentially each node can calculate precisely the cost of its action based on P τ i and, with the knowledge that P τ i and C i (P τ ) are independent of each other, has the ability to maximise its payoff function regardless of having direct knowledge of any other player's action at a specific time. In the next section we discuss the condition for which our payoff function can produce a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium and thus all nodes can independently reach almost the same channel access probability, which can then maximise the network performance.
B. Nash Equilibrium
The objective in our noncooperative game model is to find the equilibrium solution for a wireless network with self-interested nodes in a distributed manner. A well-known solution for noncooperative games is the Nash equilibrium [13] , which jointly maximises all the players' utilities.
Based on the game we defined in section II-A, the Nash equilibrium satisfies the following condition [13] :
where u i (.) is the payoff function of player i, and P τ * −i is a Nash equilibrium strategy vector for all the players except player i (P
Eq. (7) states that each player i, in choosing P τ * i is playing its best response to all the other players' strategy choices. This statement is true if P τ * i satisfies following condition [13] :
Note that the equilibrium condition in Eq. (8) does not guarantee that the equilibrium is unique and implies that, at the Nash equilibrium, P τ i * can take values at the boundaries of the strategy space which results in poor performance in terms of throughput and fairness. However, if it satisfies Eq. (9) then the equilibrium P τ i * is guaranteed to be a unique nontrivial equilibrium [13] :
In order to meet the condition in Eq. (9) the utility function U i (P τ i ) must be continuously differentiable and strictly concave. Since Eq. (6) is an integral, and since
) is a continuous and decreasing function (the larger the channel access probability, the smaller the conditional collision probability see Eq. (4)), it follows that U i (P τ i ) is a non-decreasing function: This implies that U i (P τ i ) is strictly concave. Therefore, u i (P τ ) is continuous and concave in P τ i . Hence, there exists a nontrivial Nash equilibrium for game G [13] .
C. Utility Function Design
Choosing an appropriate utility function requires considerable insight into the problem at hand. We formulate our utility function for each node in the network in such a manner as to ensure that the design of the utility function results in a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium for each node. Based on the idle sense method [11] we reverse engineer DCF from the desired operation point. In [11] , a medium access method is proposed which uses the mean number of consecutive idle slots between two transmission attempts. Let us denote bȳ n i the mean number of consecutive idle slots between two transmission attempts (successful transmission, or collision, or frame corruption). This can be written as a function of P idle i (probability of channel being idle) as follows,
Under the assumption of the Poisson arrival process, the channel idle probability is [2] , [11] ,
It can be shown [11] , that provided we use an equal contention window for all competing nodes in a network, as N → ∞, this leads to P idle(opt) i
, T s is a slot duration which is a a fixed period of time and T c is the average collision duration. Thus, the optimal number of idle slots between two transmission attempts becomes,
If DCF does not use a RTS/CTS handshake scheme then the average collision duration becomes,
otherwise,
where P HY hdr is the header of the physical layer and M AC hdr is the header of the MAC layer. L is the packet length/size, v is the bit rate andσ is the propagation delay. Note thatn opt i∞ is completely determined by the protocol parameters and not by estimating the number of nodes in the network. In [11] it is shown that as number of competing nodes increases, the optimal number of idle slots converges quickly ton opt i∞ see (Fig. 1) . This indicates that any deviation fromn opt i∞ will result in decreasing the network performance in terms of both throughput and fairness.
Therefore, without loss of generality, for a large number of nodes (N ≥ 10), In order to reverse engineer the utility function from the desired point of operation, it can be shown [2] , [11] that,
Therefore, according to Eq. (15) the utility function at its maximum should be P idle i
(P τ ) = e −ξ . By applying Eq. (6) we obtain the utility function. However, this function is not a strictly nondecreasing function, hence it cannot guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. A convenient approximate choice that satisfies the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is,
Note that as mentioned before when N is large the optimal channel access probability that maximises the throughput is very small [11] . Applying Eq. (6) we derive the utility function as follows,
Therefore the payoff function now becomes,
Eq. (18) is new and differs from that of [10] in that we avoid introducing extraneous approximations in its derivation.
D. Dynamics of Random Access Game
We now proceed to investigate how interacting players converge to a Nash equilibrium, Since we adopt a noncooperative, static, game-theoretic approach to model contentionbased wireless medium access, we consider repeated play of the random access game, and seek an update mechanism in which players repeatedly adjust strategies in response to observations of other player actions, so as to achieve the Nash equilibrium. The simplest strategy update mechanism is best response. At each stage, every node chooses the best response to the actions of all the other nodes in the previous round, by maximising Eq. (19). Mathematically, at stage t + 1, node i ∈ N chooses a channel access probability derived from stage t. Then each node i ∈ N updates its contention window CW i as follows,
Eq. (20) is derived from Eq. (5) with the assumption that if the size of contention window remains constant, P τ i and P c i become independent of each other. This relation is extremely accurate when we have a large number of nodes in network (N ≥ 10), as validated through extensive simulations by [14] , [2] . Clearly, if the above game reaches a steady state, then this state is a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, there are no known convergence results for general games using this approach. We thus consider an alternative strategy update mechanism called gradient play [15] . Each node i ∈ N updates its strategy according to,
where E(P τ ) > 0 is step size towards the equilibrium The gradient play admits a nice economic interpretation, if we interpret the conditional collision probability C i (P τ (t)) as contention price for node i. If the marginal utility U i (P τ i (t)) is greater than the contention price, we increase the channel access probability. Conversely if the marginal utility is less than contention price, we decrease the access probability; then using Eq.(20) each node updates its strategy. The step size determines the convergence speed. In our game we choose a constant step size E(P τ ) for all nodes because same payoff function is used for all nodes which make the network homogeneous, and also our network is single cell which means all nodes can see each other. Therefore, the same step size in homogeneous single cell network can guarantee the convergence of the whole network in almost a fixed number of transmissions.
III. MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL DESIGN
Based on section II, we design a medium access model that each node adopts, instead of using a binary exponential back-off scheme. Each node computes locally its displacement from equilibrium using U i (P τ i (t))−C i (P τ (t)) in a distributed manner, and uses it to adjust the size of its contention window (see Table I for a formal description of this scheme in the form of an algorithm) in order to achieve an optimal channel access probability P τ i , which leads to optimal throughput as well as short-time fairness for each node. The variable maxtrans in Table I denotes the size of the observation window which only depends on the number of transmission attempts. As ntrans increases,n i approachesn i . In the next section we explain how to obtain C i (P τ (t)) only by listening for consecutive idle slots in the shared transmission medium.
A. Conditional Collision Probability Estimation
In order to have an accurate estimation of the conditional collision probability we have used the same method as in 
/ * COMPUTE NEW CHANNEL ACCESS PROBABILITY * /
. Therefore, the conditional collision probability can be estimated via the observation of the wireless medium over several time slots. The parameters in our access method depend only on the protocol parameters that enable the gametheoretic model to provide a feedback scheme which does not need to differentiate between collided and corrupted frames. Thus, as aforesaid, we seek a channel access method that decouples the channel access probability from the conditional collision probability in order to provide us with the ability to discriminate between channel contention and occasional channel lack of reliability. Therefore, the conditional collision probability can be written using Eq. (4) and (11) as
Combining Eqs. (10) and (22) yields with good accuracy,
which is determined through monitoring the consecutive idle time slots in the transmission medium only.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section the performance of the proposed model is simulated and compared with the standard IEEE 802.11 DCF basic access method (i.e. not RTS/CTS). We use the OMNeT++ simulator [16] with the MiXiM modeling framework for mobile and fixed wireless networks [17] . All relevant simulation parameters are listed in Table II . We use IEEE 802.11b DSSS PHY layer [1] parameters as input to our gametheoretic random access model, as discussed in section II-C and III: T c /T s = 0.7658, maxtrans = 5, and the step size for gradient play is E(P τ ) = 0.020. To evaluate our model by simulation, we consider a single cell network with homogeneous users and a perfect radio channel. All nodes are in saturation mode. We have employed a constant payload packet size of 12,000 bits. All simulations run for 1,000 s to ensure convergence and stability of design.
A. Throughput
The saturation throughput achieved by our model against IEEE 802.11b in DCF mode is shown in Fig. 2 as the number of competing nodes varies from 2 to 50, respectively. Our model is slightly worse but almost matches the throughput of IEEE 802.11b for 3 and 4 nodes, but manages to maintain this level of normalised throughput for up to 50 nodes, while the throughput of IEEE 802.11b decreases almost linearly to below 0.5. The reason for a lower game-theoretic access scheme throughput for low numbers of users is that our choice of a utility function (c.f. section II-C) is designed based on an optimal number of idle slots for large number of nodes. (N ≥ 10 in practice, see Fig. 1 ).
B. Fairness
It is well-known that the DCF back-off scheme (binary exponential back-off) has poor short-time fairness [5] . This is the case for two reasons. First, a node that fails to transmit successfully has to wait for a longer period of time before it retries. Second, is whenever a failed transmission is reported, DCF automatically considers it as a collision and therefore it executes a binary exponential back-off with similar results. Fig. 3 compares the short-time fairness of our model and DCF using the Jain fairness index which is defined as follows [18] ,
where m i is the number of transmissions of node i over a specific time window. As shown in Fig. 3 , our model produces a much better short-time fairness than IEEE 802.11b DCF, as expected due to the sharing of the same contention window by all the nodes in the cell, which results in same channel access probability for all nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed a game-theoretic model for contention control and proposed a medium access method derived from CSMA/CA, in which each node estimates its state in a game and adjusts its persistence probability or contention window according to its displacement from the Nash equilibrium. This results in harmonised but independently determined performance objectives for all competing nodes, through the specification of per-node utility functions. As wireless nodes can estimate the conditional collision probability by observing consecutive idle slots between transmissions, we can decouple contention control from handling failed transmissions. As shown in numerical simulations our game-theoretic medium access control design exhibits stable optimal throughput and good short-term fairness. Given that the network is in saturation mode, this also implies a low collision probability and channel access delay. Our protocol is highly dependent on the estimation of consecutive idle slot times. Therefore, a wrong choice of maxtrans which defines the size of the observation window can lead to a collapse of the game. Also, the step size has to be chosen appropriately in order to converge to the desired point of operation with a reasonable convergence speed. This is an empirically arrived at compromise which balances convergence speed against protocol instability which arises by choosing a larger step size for the update mechanism in our design.
Work is at hand to extend the game-theoretic access model to find better solutions that address the problem of hidden and exposed terminals, so as to address multi-cell problems. We plan to address this problem in our future work using notion of mixed strategy in game theory. Furthermore, such an extended game-theoretic access model can be adapted to deal with cell-to-cell coordination issues in dense WiFi networks by addressing a multi-tier contention scenario, which is naturally addressed by nested games.
